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NEW APPROACHES TO
CHURCH-STATE
LITIGATION
DAVID

J. YOUNG, ESQUIRE

The topic for today, church-state litigation as it relates to nonpublic
schools, would have been much easier to prepare if the authors of The
Brethren had decided to include this subject. As soon as the book came
out, I read it to see if it was going to cover aid to nonpublic school cases.
If they had, we would know the "real" reason why the Court accepted
jurisdiction in one case and rejected it in another. We would obtain copies
of hidden drafts of opinions that never were published. We would find
out who traded abortion votes for education votes and education votes for
baseball antitrust votes. But since the authors opted not to cover that
subject, we must develop our insights the hard way. We will have to view
the subject in its historical perspective to see what has happened in the
past and to see where we are today.
If the subject of new approaches to church-state litigation were on
the agenda 2 or 3 years ago, we would all be here in dark suits. That
would be the proper attire and we would all reflect a very somber demeanor. At that time, we had behind us the terrible experience of Lemon
v. Kurtzman' in 1971, the Nyquist' series of cases in 1973, and the Meek 8
decision in 1975. The entire Catholic educational community was in a
state of shock. I am pleased to state that we have an entirely different
situation today. The extremely important decisions in Wolman v. Walter4
and Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan' provide realistic bases for optimism. What I would like to talk about today
is: where do we go from here? If we have seen a reversal of the downward
momentum, what does it mean? What should we be doing in terms of
new state legislation? How should we defend ESEA? What about new
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
4 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
6 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
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federal legislation? What do these recent decisions teach us?
In order to provide some insights, I would like to discuss Regan, the
most recent decision. Before trying to reach some conclusion or to respond to your questions with respect to Regan's teaching, however, I
would like to examine the historical perspective of church-state litigation.
If we combine that historical perspective with a careful reading of Regan,
perhaps we can reach some conclusions with respect to where our future
lies.
Hopefully, during the midst of this analysis, we can talk about some
new approaches to church-state litigation, possible new cases to challenge
some of the terribly repressive, ad hoc criteria which have been developed
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the years 1971 through
1975, and provide some further insights concerning how we can continue
to stress the other side of the first amendment coin-the free exercise and
the establishment clauses. Let us first turn to Regan. As you know, it is a
short decision as well as a five to four victory. It arose from New York.
The decision was written by Justice White and he was joined by Justices
Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell. The rather strong dissent by
Justice Blackmun is quite instructive. Most of us realized that we had
lost Justice Stevens before Regan. There is no question about it now. His
dissent is unequivocal.
When I talk to educators throughout our state and nation, the major
question is how important a victory was Regan. There are those who suggest it is limited to funding. It only provided $8 to $12 million and that is
not a great sum of money for New York. There are those who suggest that
reimbursement for testing, record keeping, and attendance taking is not
very significant. I believe those who downplay the importance of Regan
are being extremely shortsighted. I classify it as a tremendously important victory and I think the people in New York who are responsible for
it should be congratulated. To be sure, Regan, in and of itself, is not going to solve the financial problems of those who have to suffer with administration of nonpublic schools under financial disability. But we are
not going to find any one case that is going to solve those financial
problems. We must build the foundation through a series of cases. Hopefully, this will help us achieve our ultimate goal: equitable distribution of
education tax dollars.
Those of us who have studied the long series of Levitt decisionsO
know that more than anything else, they stand as a tribute to the persistence of the people in New York. Regan had its genesis in legislation
which was adopted either in the very late 1960's or the very early 1970's.
The basic premise of that legislation was that the state mandated testing
' Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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of pupils, record keeping, and attendance taking. If the state requires
these things, however, it should pay for them. This was certainly a laudable objective. If that sort of legislation had been adopted immediately
after Board of Education v. Allen' rather than after Lemon it certainly
would have been sustained.
The case was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1973-the same time the Court decided Nyquist and some 2 years after Lemon. The Court rejected the constitutionality of the legislation on
the ground that some of the aid was for teacher-preparedtests. Teacherprepared tests could inculcate religious values. It used the same formula
which had been developed in Lemon. If it is potentially religious, then
there is a primary religious effect. If you have controls to ensure that
there is no religious assistance, then you have excessive religious entanglement between government and church.
This problem caught Levitt the first time in 1973. As most of you will
recall, New York came back a second time with an attempt not necessarily to change the constitutional principle but to obtain retroactive reimbursement. I think that occurred in New York v. CathedralAcademy and
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty8 and, as I
recall, it failed. Meanwhile, in 1977, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided the Wolman case which involved nine different separable
branches of aid, one of which was standardized achievement testing. The
way we drafted legislation in Ohio, the state provided the tests. They
were sent back to neutral scoring authorities. It was clearly a neutral nonideological form of aid.
There are those who would suggest that Regan is merely an extension
of Wolman, but it really is more than that. It goes further than Wolman
in this particular regard. Regan does several things beyond what was approved in Wolman. The most important of which is that rather than supply the tests and the scoring, Regan provides financial reimbursement for
the cost of testing, the cost of scoring, and for record keeping and attendance taking. Justice White often writes brief and understandable opinions. He made it look as though there is no real difference. But, in the
long run, the fact that the Court moved one step forward will be tremendously significant.
Most important, however, is the second prong of what Wolman
started and what Regan accomplished. What we have seen from Wolman
and Regan is a reversal of many of those repressive criteria established
earlier, and a movement towards the Allen criteria developed in 1968.
Shortly after our victory in Wolman, I wrote an article for the Ohio
7 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
a 434 U.S. 125 (1977); 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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State Law Journal.' At that time, I was very concerned about the repressive doctrines that had stymied so many of our efforts to achieve equitable distribution of education tax dollars. So, rather than simply state
where the law was then, I tried to suggest where it ought to go. I quoted
from the 1976 decision of Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland,10 in which higher education aid was upheld. The Court stated that
"[t]he slate we write on is anything but clean. Instead, there is little room
for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to churchaffiliated private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those principles,
so recently affirmed ... or to expand upon them substantially, but
merely to insure that they are faithfully applied in this case.""
Now, if that were the law and if that were the way the law was to
remain, we would be in trouble. Those principles would have destroyed
our efforts to achieve assistance to nonpublic school pupils. I wrote at
that time:
Notwithstanding these assurances by the Court that this area of the law is
settled, the question still remains: has the thoughtful scholarship of the Supreme Court's most respected Justices provided a framework that will avoid
continued controversy? This article will show that they have not. Despite
the strong assertions in recent decisions by the Court that religion clause
principles are well defined, the fact is that there have been periodic major
shifts in the factors the Court considers in judging the constitutionality of a
state aid program. These shifts have had a divisive impact on the Court. In
recent years this division has resolved itself into a three-way split. This article attempts to identify the current trend of the Court in state aid cases by
analyzing this split and the recent movement of the swing group of
Justices."
If you will recall, after Wolman, it looked as though there was a
three-way split in the Court. Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and White probably would have approved most of the well-drafted programs. Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens would have proceeded little further than
providing for health assistance. Then we had those three very, very important Justices in the middle-Blackmun, Stewart and Powell. When
one looks at the history before Wolman, when one notes what the Court
was saying immediately before Wolman and Regan concerning the repressive principles from Lemon and Nyquist being "in concrete," and when
one compares that to what is being said in Regan, the shift in the Su' Young,

Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related
Schools-Internal Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO
ST. L.J. 783 (1977).
10 426 U.S. 736 (1976).

Id. at 754.
Young, supra note 9, at 785.
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preme Court is apparent and meaningful. Justice Blackmun, in the second paragraph of his dissent in Regan, complains that the Court's judgments in Meek and in Wolman at last had fixed the line between that
which is constitutionally appropriate public aid and that which is not. He
concludes the initial section of his dissenting opinion by talking about the
defection of Justices Powell and Stewart, stating: "I am able to attribute
this defection only to a concern about the continuing and emotional controversy and to a persuasion that a good-faith attempt on the part of
state legislature is worth a nod of approval."' 8 So, suddenly, many of the
repressive doctrines are not being mentioned and Justice Blackmun is
complaining about their demise.
Thus, when one looks at Regan with this historical perspective, when
one observes what was not said, one begins to appreciate the significance
of the decision.
I am optimistic about the long-range implication of Regan. There are
those who are similarly excited, and, in their unbridled optimism, urge
precipitous action. Some would urge that since we have minimum
achievement standards in all the states, and since it is mandatory to have
qualified mathematics, English, and history courses, the state should
finance this mandate. This takes Regan to its logical extension; however, I
am not yet that optimistic. The USCC has recently sent out a note of
caution to prevent overreaction. In the last 15 years I have been a critic of
excessive caution; but, I must admit that at this particular time, I join the
USCC in that caution. I recall what happened after Allen. There we tried
to build a roof on the house before the foundation was built. Here we
must build a foundation before we achieve our ultimate goals. I am much
more optimistic that we can achieve those goals today than I have been at
any time since 1968 when Allen was decided.
Often, we can best apply proper historical perspectives by looking at
a chronological chart. This is why I developed the chart passed out today.
One of our paralegals did some charting and prepared various lists to try
to see if they could provide additional insights for future strategy. We are
always struggling with the questions: should we build a record, should we
stipulate, should we go forward solely on the pleadings? That is why that
portion of the chart is present. It is not instructive so we need not pay
much attention to it. The chart also shows a breakdown of judges, but
frankly, it was not very instructive either. Our current split of judges is
recent and only the last couple of years are instructive. Not every case on
the chart is an aid to nonpublic school cases; some are cases which we
have cited frequently in the nonpublic school cases.
If you have your chart, you can look at the case itself, the year it was
is

444 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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decided, and the result. This is particularly instructive and reflects the
trends and shifting of judicial response.
The chart starts out with Bradford v. Roberts," not because it is a
nonpublic school aid case (it involved aid to hospitals), but because its
rationale is quite helpful. Perhaps we should have added Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.1" It also helps build our foundation even though it was not an
aid case.
The next case, Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education,16
sustained a textbook loan program, though first amendment principles
had not yet been honed. It simply serves as a good starting point in the
school aid series. The next case was, of course, Everson v. Board of Education" which was decided in 1947, and which stands today as the first
aid case decided on first amendment grounds. The case was a five to four
decision. We all know that Justice Black later said that if he had it to do
over again, he would have voted the other way. So, from 1947 until 1967,
Everson was of questionable precedential value. Pennsylvania's bus bill
16
case came before the United States Supreme Court at about that time.
The Court refused jurisdiction, thereby solidifying Everson.
When we review our historical perspective we see that Everson is
similar to Regan. Everson sustained not just bus rides, but compensation
to parents for the cost of bus rides. That was a dollar aid to parents. It
said that you cannot deny general welfare benefits to children because of
their faith or lack thereof.
Today, Everson stands as valuable precedent. If there had been an
effort to expand the aid immediately, however, we would have seen not
only the expansion effort fail, but we may have lost Everson. It would
have provided Justice Black with an opportunity to shift his vote.
Between 1948 and 1952 we saw the McCollum v. Board of Education 9 and Zorach v. Clauson,2 0 release-time cases. All of you know that
this reversal resulted from a careful testing of the McCollum case. That
careful testing caused the Court to permit an alternate approach. In 1968
the Supreme Court rendered its finest decision relating to aid to nonpublic school pupils. The Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Allen,"'
presented a two-fold test. In order to survive an establishment clause
challenge, the legislation must have a secular purpose and effect. It may
" 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
" 268
-6 281
17 330
" See
19 338
20 343
392

U.S. 510 (1925).
U.S. 370 (1930).
U.S. 1 (1947).
Rhodes v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 389 U.S. 11 (1967).
U.S. 203 (1948).
U.S. 306 (1952).
U.S. 236 (1968).
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neither advance nor inhibit religion. Unfortunately, the Court in 1971
added a third test that lead to disastrous results.
The Allen Court presented a logical and favorable decision on the
following facts: (1) the state had an interest in the'secular education of all
its children; (2) the church-related schools which the children opted to
attend met state-established minimum standards; (3) the nonpublic
schools accomplished both religious and secular objectives; and (4) the
secular education was not so permeated with religious education that one
could not aid one without aiding the other. This was an excellent analysis.
Many reasonable people who were drafting legislation providing aid to
nonpublic school pupils felt that the door was wide open. I cannot criticize people who interpreted the decision in that way and rushed forward
with legislation calling for substantial forms of aid, because I felt the
same way at the time. Even so, the events after Allen prove quite instructive. Perhaps, if all of us had noted more carefully Justice Burger's opinion in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of the City of New York, 2 which was
decided shortly after Allen, we would have exercised more caution. Although Walz was a victory, it led to the announcement of the third test.
The Walz decision arose from New York. It involved the constitutional
validity of tax exemption for church-related institutions. A taxpayer in
New York argued: "My first amendment rights are violated when you exempt churches and this causes me to spend my tax dollars for religious
purposes." In sustaining the validity of tax exemption in New York, Justice Burger reasoned that there was less entanglement between church
and state with tax exemption than without. He spoke of the evils of state
entanglement in church affairs. This, of course, gave birth to the repressive doctrine that arose in the nonpublic aid cases in the following year,
1971.
The next reported school aid cases were the Lemon and DiCenso decisions. Pennsylvania read Allen as opening the door and concluded that
a program of educational service contracts between church schools and
the state would be upheld. The state paid the schools for providing stateaccredited secular education. This was declared unconstitutional in
Lemon. Rhode Island presented a different aid program in DiCenso. This
program addressed itself to the major cost incurred by nonpublic schoolteacher salaries. The program called for the state to supplement the salary of teachers who were teaching secular education. Rhode Island had a
disastrous result at the district court level. Lemon and DiCenso were
combined in the Supreme Court of the United States and you know the
result-both programs were declared unconstitutional. Justice Burger
complained of the momentum that followed Allen. His view was that once
as

397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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the idea of school aid gains momentum, it is hard to stop. Justice Harlan
said that he never saw such a thing as a slippery slope without a constitutional toehold. But Justice Burger felt that we had gone too far, too fast.
We not only lost Lemon, but because we went too far, too fast, we
invited the first of a series of new repressive doctrines. Instead of using
the purpose and effect test that had been used in Allen, Justice Burger
instituted a third test. This test of "excessive entanglement between
church and state" had two prongs. Legislation will fall if the mechanisms
established to prevent benefit to religion require administrative entanglement between church and state. The doctrine of political divisiveness was
also developed. This doctrine presumes that since such legislation aids
religious schools, it will cause divisiveness in the community along religious lines when it is before the state legislature. Consequently, this allegedly creates political divisiveness. This doctrine presents a classical bootstrap argument. No prior decision spoke of such a test. It is a terribly
repressive doctrine that could spread to a multitude of other areas.
Thus, in 1971 we experienced not only a tremendous loss but found
ourselves encumbered by two new doctrines, one more repressive than the
other. Constitutional scholars concluded after Lemon that proponents of
nonpublic school aid faced a real dilemma. If controls are not established
to ensure that the Allen effect test is met, a program will fail to meet the
primary religious effect test. Similarly, if one establishes adequate controls to ensure that there is no aid to religion, excessive entanglement
between church and state will result. So it is quite a dilemma. Even if the
test could be avoided, there is the inevitable confrontation between political divisiveness and legislation calling for additional appropriations each
biennium in the legislature, which will result in further divisiveness along
religious lines.
In retrospect it is easy to see what happened. We can see what
should have been done. In Lemon we went too far, too fast. After Lemon
we should have stepped back and said, "We are wounded so we must
pause in order to see what we are going to do before we push forward
with a new aggressive program." Instead of returning to basics, New York
presented a tripartite aid program including construction grants for lowincome schools, tuition grants for low-income parents, and tax relief for
parents who did not meet the low-income criteria. At the same time,
Pennsylvania presented a parental reimbursement,,grant program. With
the benefit of hindsight we can see why this led t"'uch a disastrous result. When we look on the chart we see that from 1968 to 1975 everything
except higher education proceeded in the wrong direction. We were losing
all of the cases. Instead of backing up and solidifying our base, we were
being more aggressive. Meek was decided in 1975. In retrospect, I think if
Meek followed Allen by 3 or 4 years, it probably would have been sustained. It was not such a substantial jump from what the Court had said
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in Allen. It was a very modest program. Meek involved equipment that
was inherently secular, neutral, and non-ideological. It involved diagnostic testing and health personnel as well as remedial reading, speech, and
hearing therapists. It was a gentle movement from Allen. If we had to do
it over again, I think Pennsylvania would have followed Allen with Meek.
The chances are that it would not have tipped our hand to such an extent
that we all wanted to go in this historic game of chess. There would have
been a much greater likelihood of it being approved. It came along, however, after the development of the Lemon and Nyquist tests. In addition
to declaring the Pennsylvania case unconstitutional, the Court developed
two more repressive tests. If one were not defeated by the administrative
entanglement and political divisiveness tests, one ran afoul of the substantial aid or the religion-pervasive test. The Court in Meek concluded
that the schools were so pervasively religious that one could not separate
secular from religion-a complete reversal of Allen. All of the favorable
principles enunciated in Allen had deteriorated.
Consequently, when we looked at the repressive Lemon, Nyquist,
and Meek doctrines and saw what the Supreme Court said in 1976 in the
Roemer case with respect to the principles being in concrete, it appeared
as though the battle had been lost. This set the stage for the Ohio plan in
Wolman.
In Wolman, Ohio did not try to blaze new trails. We looked at the
bleak scene and decided to draft a piece of legislation that could survive
and perhaps reverse the trend. For example, in Meek, the court said the
school was so pervasively religious that even a speech and hearing therapist performing therapy on the premises was aiding religion. Ohio decided
to leave the diagnostician' and the health personnel on the premises because it was more difficult to argue that they could permeate religion or
succumb to sectarianism. The Ohio plan called for other remedial personnel to perform their services beyond the edge of the property line. The
plan called for these services to be performed in mobile units and other
public facilities. The plan was based on the mobile library that parked in
front of the school. The children go out and borrow books. They take the
books they want and the mobile unit moves on. No one ever concluded
that that was unconstitutional. Therefore, we arrived at the concept of
taking auxiliary service personnel off the sectarian premises and putting
them in a mobile unit or other public facility. There are many who criticize this concept because Ohio, in effect, was recognizing the Court's prior
opinions. Well one does not have any choice! That is what the Court said,
and one must test the doctrine and attempt to establish its limits. That is
what Ohio did. The basic argument before the Supreme Court was a free
exercise argument. Meek tells us that the public employees who perform
educational services at church-related schools are likely to be influenced
by the pervasively religious atmosphere and succumb to sectarianism.
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The Ohio General Assembly responded to this concern by restricting
therapeutic, remedial, and guidance services to off premises, neutral sites,
which would not be permeated by a religious atmosphere. This means
that those services are now provided by public employees, under public
control, at neutral facilities. The American Civil Liberties Union argued
that a nonpublic school child remained a sectarian citizen after he was
released from the nonpublic school. They argued that the program would
intimidate the publicly hired and controlled specialist into succumbing to
sectarianism even at the neutral site. When the American Civil Liberties
Union urged that nonpublic school children must be denied secular, neutral, and non-ideological services at neutral facilities, they were insisting
upon a penalty for free exercise of religion.
In arguing Wolman, we stressed not only the outrage expressed by
Justice Burger in Meek, but also emphasized the footnotes presented by
Justice Stewart in response to that outrage. Two things happened in Wolman. First, the doctrine of substantial aid announced in Meek was eliminated. Eighty-eight million dollars of aid per biennium was sustained in
Wolman. Although Justice Blackmun had been saying that $8 to $10 million was substantial in Meek, the Court sustained $88 million and did not
even label it as substantial aid. The "substantiality" test was passed over
very lightly in Regan.
The second important thing which occurred in Wolman was the reduced emphasis on political divisiveness. In a footnote in Wolman, the
Court concluded that since there was no aid to religion, divisiveness with
respect to the legislative program would not be along religious lines.
Hopefully, we are seeing that doctrine die a slow death in the Supreme
Court. I know the doctrine still appears in various district courts, yet in
the two most recent Supreme Court decisions, Regan and Wolman, that
test was not determinative. Wolman served to reverse the adverse momentum. It started a new favorable trend. Regan took us a few steps further. Where do we go from here?
Some people could argue that since their state legislation mandates
accredited secular education in nonpublic schools, the state should pay
for it. This could be supported by the Regan rationale. My view is that
now that we have the benefit of the historical perspective, we know that
we moved too far, too fast after Allen. Now that we have Wolman and
Regan we should build on their precedent slowly. We should build carefully and create a solid foundation. Let us look at the kinds of aid that we
can get at the state level and then go to the federal level.
Some states still are not receiving transportation. We know that we
can obtain transportation and that we can obtain transportation reimbursement. In Ohio, many of the students receive grants for reasonable
transportation when they live far from school. These substantial dollars
were upheld in Everson. In Ohio, we are receiving a total of approxi-

26

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

1981

mately $275 per child, each year. This includes transportation, textbooks,
driver education, test aid, auxiliary health and teaching aid, and direct
assistance to administer such aid. Thus, there are a number of safe
harbors which can be used right now.
I believe that we can reverse the loss of educational materials suffered in Meek and Wolman. I propose the adoption of limited education
equipment legislation. It could include, for example, math equipment
which could be lent to the pupils. Gym equipment and physical education
materials are quite expensive in our schools. I believe that the constitutionality of legislation calling for the loan of such equipment would be
sustained. Legislation calling for the lending of math and physical education equipment would be a logical extension of Wolman and Regan. The
Title I (ESEA) cases are experimenting with returning the teacher (the
auxiliary service personnel) to the premises. One of the arguments being
used is that although services are performed at nonpublic school premises, the classroom is in effect a public school classroom. In other words, a
"leased classroom" approach. I advise against trying to expand the Wolman doctrine through the use of teaching personnel on the premises until
after we see what happens in the Title I cases.
After the Title I cases reach the United States Supreme Court, I
would like to find a case where a public school district, which has no
schools of its own, reimburses its residents for the cost of education in an
accredited school outside the district. That will be the ideal way to test
grants to children or parents. This will present a broad base of applicability and our opponents will be unable to argue that it is a unique and
special program designed for children attending religious schools. That
would be an ideal program which would enable us to build a foundation
before building the walls and roof.
Although I have recommended some restraints because of the pendency of the Title I cases, I think that we should prevail upon competent
counsel, defending those cases, to be careful with respect to their various
defenses. I do not like a defense which calls for placing teachers in the
classroom because we do not inculcate religious values in the schools. If
we win on that kind of logic, we will have won a case but lost the war.
Remember this is an historic game of chess! We do not want to win a case
that impairs our long-range objectives. Only a small percentage of educational aid comes from the federal government. The big dollars come from
state legislation. If a federal case is won based upon a theory that destroys state elementary and secondary school aid, I submit we will have
sustained a tremendous loss.
The arguments proposed in defense of some of the higher education
cases greatly disturb me. At the same time we were losing Lemon, we won
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Tilton v. Richardson.
At the same time we were losing Nyquist we won
4
Hunt v. McNair.2 But what did these cases tell us? "You can receive
college aid if you are not effective at accomplishing your religious mission." Well, if there is no religious mission, the schools should not exist as
Catholic schools. If we achieve state aid at the loss of inculcation of religious values, what have we achieved?
The temptation is great for us to rush too quickly after Regan. The
temptation is great to win these cases at any cost. But such temptations
must be resisted.
My final suggestion relates to future federal aid programs. Time does
not permit discussion of the reasons why a federal program has a greater
likelihood of success than its counterpart at the state level. Although I
caution against state tuition grant legislation in the near future, I strongly
recommend that we attempt to obtain income tax credit assistance at the
federal level.
I would like to conclude by recalling a lunch I had with my dear
friend, Bishop Elwell, shortly before his death. He always said, "How
long-how long before we obtain true equity in educational tax dollar distribution?" At this lunch he urged: "I'm getting old, I would like to see
this accomplished before I die." Well-we could not deliver. Even so, I
look forward to the day when I can whisper to the good Bishop: "It is a
little late-but here it is, Bishop Elwell-true equity-fair aid for our
children."
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